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 Abstract—Communication networks, such as optical core 
networks heavily depend on their physical infrastructure, and 
hence they are vulnerable to man-made disasters, such as 
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) or Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) attacks, as well as to natural disasters, such as 
earthquakes. Large-scale disasters may cause huge data loss and 
connectivity disruption in these networks. As society’s 
dependence on network services increases, the need for novel 
survivability methods to mitigate the effects of disasters on 
communication networks becomes a major concern.   Software-
Defined Networking (SDN), by centralizing control logic and 
separating it from physical equipment, facilitates network 
programmability and opens up new ways to design disaster-
resilient networks. On the other hand, to fully exploit the 
potential of SDN, along with data-plane survivability we also 
need to design the control plane to be resilient enough to survive 
network failures caused by disasters. For resiliency of the 
control-plane, we need to select appropriate mapping of the 
controllers over the physical network, and then ensure that the 
connectivity among the controllers (controller-to controller) and 
between the controllers and the switches (switch to controllers) is 
not compromised by physical infrastructure failures. Several 
distributed SDN controller architectures have been proposed to 
mitigate the risks of overload and failure, but they are optimized 
for limited faults without addressing the extent of large-scale 
disaster failures. In this paper, we present a novel disaster-aware 
control-plane design and mapping scheme, formally model this 
problem, and demonstrate a significant reduction in the 
disruption of controller-to-controller and switch-to-controller 
communication channels using our approach. 
Index Terms—SDN, Survivable Control Plane, Disaster 
Survivability, Virtual Network Mapping. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Disasters events (e.g., due to Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) 
and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attacks, 
earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.) represent a challenging threat for 
communication networks, such as optical backbone networks, 
as they affect large geographical areas and may cause multiple 
network failures in the disaster zone. These failures could also 
be cascading, i.e., when a disaster occurs, initially a set of 
network elements may fail simultaneously, and then other 
failures in different parts of the network may occur 
subsequently (e.g., due to a power outage following an 
earthquake). Especially, targeted events, such as EMP attacks 
[1] and WMD attacks, tend to be more catastrophic compared 
to a random natural disaster. 
Recent disaster events have shown the enormous loss of 
network resources caused by both initial failures and 
correlated cascading failures [2]. For instance, in the 2008 
Shichuan earthquake, around 30,000 km of fiber optic cables 
and 4,000 telecom offices were damaged [3]. In the 2011 
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, around 1,500 telecom 
buildings experienced long power outages by the main shock 
on March 11; while most were fixed, 700 telecom buildings 
experienced power outages by the aftershock on April 7, 2011 
[2]. Because of the potential huge data loss and network-
connectivity disruptions, high-capacity optical communication 
networks must be designed to provide resiliency against 
disasters, be adaptable to rapidly-changing network conditions 
due to disasters, and be able to recover after disasters, even if 
they are infrequent.  
Today’s networks are inflexible to effectively respond to 
large, complex disaster failures. They are rigidly vertically-
integrated, i.e., control and data planes are bundled together, 
and this is a main reason behind the complexity of network 
reconfiguration and management. Software-defined 
networking (SDN), a new networking paradigm, has emerged 
as a promising candidate to support the new demands and 
requirements of current and future communication networks. 
SDN breaks vertical integration of traditional networks by 
separating the network’s control logic from the underlying 
routers and switches, promotes (logical) centralization of 
network control, and introduces the ability to program the 
network. The evolution of traditional control logic towards a 
centralized control plane simplifies network management, 
facilitates new vendor-independent network innovations, and 
introduces new optimization opportunities with the global 
view it provides. 
These new functions of SDN can be exploited to provide 
higher survivability against disasters, but these opportunities 
come with a cost. In SDN, along with data-plane survivability, 
we also need to design the control plane and its 
communication with the data plane to be resilient enough to 
survive disaster disruptions.  
Early deployments of SDN relied on physically-centralized 
control-plane architectures with a single controller, but a 
centralized system suffers from scalability, performance, and 
reliability problems in a large network deployment. Even a 
very powerful controller will lack the CPU and memory 
capacity necessary to maintain complete network state, and 
react to all network events, for large, high-capacity networks 
[5]. Also, the centralized design is vulnerable to disruptions 
and attacks, particularly to single point of failures [6]. Several 
distributed SDN controller architectures have been proposed 
to mitigate the risks of overload and failures. However, 
disaster-resilient design of control plane is almost unexplored, 
and it poses several challenges. As disasters occur in specific 
geographical locations and disrupt specific parts of the 
network, design of the network determines the impact of the 
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 disasters. Ignoring the vulnerable regions of the physical 
network while designing the distributed control plane and 
assigning switches to controller instances increases the risk of 
disconnection between switches and controllers, as well as 
controller-to-controller communication. Reprovisioning these 
communication channels can cause huge time loss in the event 
of disasters, and eventually connection disruption rate 
increases. To address this, we present a new approach to 
design the control plane in a disaster-aware manner by 
considering it as a virtual network, and solving it using a 
modified virtual-network-embedding approach. Our scheme 
decides on the number and placement of the controllers, maps 
them onto the physical network, and assigns switches to 
distributed controller instances in a disaster-resilient way.  
The rest of this study is organized as follows: Section II 
reviews previous works on disaster resilience in 
communication networks and SDN. Section III presents the 
proposed disaster-resilient control-plane design framework, 
and its mathematical formulation is provided in Section IV. 
Section V describes the simulation scenario and presents the 
obtained results. Finally, Section VI concludes the study. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Researchers have proposed a number of techniques to 
overcome the disadvantages of the physical centralization of 
the SDN control plane in terms of not being robust against 
overloads and failures. Proposals exist to push the intelligence 
into the switches to offload the controller [7][8] and to offer a 
basic connectivity in the data plane [9]. Also, a logically-
centralized yet physically-distributed control plane as in Fig. 1 
has been built such as Kandoo, HyperFlow, and Onix [10], 
which can benefit from the scalability and reliability of a 
distributed architecture while preserving the simplicity of a 
centralized system. Besides providing higher survivability 
against network failures, advantages of the distributed control 
plane include more scalability (control-plane throughput 
increases as many controllers can be used for load balancing) 
and reduced control delay by choosing the quickest-
responding controller. 
The problem of how many controllers to use and where to 
place them in the distributed control-plane design was studied 
in [11] using a static setting and with a fixed number and 
placement of controllers. Refs. [10][12] propose dynamic 
controller provisioning where number of controllers and their 
locations change dynamically with changing network 
conditions to minimize flow setup time and communication 
overhead.  
Nonetheless, even considering the inherent survivability of 
a distributed control-plane system, controller distribution does 
not guarantee control-plane network connectivity, which is a 
necessity for SDN to function properly against network 
failures, especially after a large-scale disaster failure. Existing 
distributed control-plane designs do not address the extent of 
large-scale disasters, despite the catastrophic disaster effects 
on communication networks that have been experienced in the 
past. 
The first step in disaster survivability is modeling the 
disaster. Several studies (e.g., [13]) aim at modelling disasters 
and define the parts of the network that are more vulnerable to 
regional/correlated failures caused by disasters for analysis 
and/or design purposes. Although there are many studies that 
exploit the information on vulnerable regions of the network 
to proactively (before disasters occur) and/or reactively (after 
disasters) take necessary actions to minimize the loss in data 
plane, disaster resilience in SDN control plane is largely 
unexplored. 
In this work, we study the problem of designing a disaster-
resilient SDN-based control plane to make the control plane 
resilient and dynamically adaptable to all disruptions: 
controller failure, inter-controller communication failure, and 
controller-to-switch communication. 
Fig. 1. Distributed control-plane architecture. 
III. DISASTER-AWARE CONTROL-PLANE DESIGN 
 A distributed control-plane topology can be designed as an 
overlay (i.e., virtual/logical) network mapped over a physical 
(i.e., backbone) network, which we call the Control Network 
Mapping (CNM) problem. This mapping problem can be 
solved using virtual network embedding (VNE) [14-15] 
techniques which are defined as the assignment of virtual 
network resources to physical network elements, e.g., virtual 
links are created using multi-hop physical links. CNM 
allocates necessary resources in the substrate network through 
node mapping and link mapping. Different from the traditional 
VNE problem, in CNM, a virtual network (control network in 
this case) topology is not given, i.e., the selection of the 
number of virtual nodes (controllers) and of the virtual links 
connecting them are also a part of this new problem. The 
selection of virtual links and nodes, and their mappings are 
jointly optimized, because preselecting a virtual topology 
without considering its relation to the link-mapping phase 
restricts the solution space and can result in poor performance. 
Given these additional decisions, existing schemes already 
developed for Wavelength-Division Multiplexing (WDM), 
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) or 
Layer 2/3 VNE solutions are not directly applicable to our 
problem. 
In Fig. 2(a), a control plane is mapped onto a physical 
topology while minimizing resource usage, whereas in Fig.  
 2(b), the control plane is mapped considering a predicted 
disaster zone. After a disaster occurs, in the disaster-unaware  
design, one of the controllers (C3) fails, and hence the 
switches connected to it get disconnected from the control 
logic of the network. Also, the control plane gets islanded, and 
the switches connected to the controllers located on different 
islands can no longer communicate. Although the physical 
topology is still connected, due to the control-plane 
disconnection, the data plane also gets islanded. 
 
1. Disaster Risk Modeling 
To devise a disaster-resilient mapping the control plane, 
network vulnerability to different types of disasters in 
different locations needs to be assessed. In this study, we use a 
probabilistic disaster model [13], where a network component 
inside the affected region of a disaster fails with a probability 
that depends on many factors such as its distance from the 
disaster's epicenter, and type and magnitude of the disaster. 
Using this model, we calculate a vulnerability metric, called 
disaster risk, to be used to design a disaster-resilient control 
plane. Disaster risk captures the expected connectivity loss of 
the control plane due to controller node failure, inter-controller 
communication failure, and controller-to-switch 
communication failure given the location, span, and 
probability of occurrence of the potential disasters. Risk is 
calculated by the formula: ∑ ∑ ∈∈ ∙ 	
          (1) 
where Y is the set of all disasters; P is set of all paths used for 
controller-to-controller and controller-to-switch 
communications;  ∈ 0,1: 1 if path p is affected in case of 
disaster y; and 	
  is the probability of occurrence of disaster 
y multiplied by probability that disaster y causes a failure. This 
formula covers controller node failures because, when a node 
is down, paths passing through that node also get affected. 
 
2. Problem Statement 
We formalize and investigate this new problem of CNM to 
ensure control-plane connectivity against both single point of 
failures and large-scale disaster failures. We present a 
mathematical formulation for jointly optimizing the virtual 
topology design and virtual network embedding such that 
control-network connectivity is ensured after failures. 
This problem can be stated as follows: Given the network 
topology with the nodes (switches) connected to a datacenter 
(which are possible locations for controller placement) and 
survivability requirements of the network, find the number of 
controllers, decide on the virtual topology, and perform 
virtual control network mapping such that the network is 
survivable against any single point of failure and predicted 
disaster failures while minimizing physical resource usage. 
While minimizing the resource usage, we also consider inter-
controller and switch-to-controller delay to be able to respond 
to failures promptly. The ultimate aim is to make the control 
plane resilient to controller failure, inter-controller 
communication failure, and controller-to-switch 
communication failure. 
 
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
We formulate the problem of designing a control plane 
(deciding on the number of controllers, their placement, and 
the control-plane topology) and mapping it on a physical 
network as an integer linear program (ILP), given below. To 
simplify the model, we assume that physical links have no 
constraints on bandwidth resource. Also, we assume control 
communication is in-band (i.e., control communication 
channels use data-plane resources). A subset of the switches 
has datacenters located onsite, where controllers can be 
deployed. We evaluate the disaster risk of paths between 
switch to controller and controller to controller offline. Based 
on the risk information, our formulation decides the number 
and placement of controllers, maps the control plane, and 
performs controller-to-switch assignments. 
We ensure control-plane connectivity after the predicted 
disaster occurrence by assigning two disaster-zone-disjoint 
virtual paths for each controller-to-controller communication. 
We formulate the problem as follows: 
Given: 
• G(N,E): Network topology where N is the set of nodes and 
E is the set of directed links. 
• F: Set of network nodes which are connected to a datacenter 
where a controller can be deployed. Only these switches can 
host a controller. 
•  ∈ 0, 1: 1 if node j is located within node i’s 
reachability island. Reachability island of a node is a 
 
 
a) Traditional control network design and mapping b) Disaster-aware control network design and mapping 
Fig. 2. Control network mapping (CNM). 
Disaster zone 
 circular region where shortest-path distance to every node 
within this region from this node satisfies the latency 
constraint of this node. Latency constraint can be 
determined by the network operator and depends on the 
required time to react a particular event (such as connection 
arrival, departure, etc.) 
• : Number of controllers that must be guaranteed to be 
located within a certain latency limit by every switch.  
• : At least q controllers are active at any time in the 
network. 
• : Maximum number of switches that can be assigned to 
any controller.  
• : Set of possible paths to be used for virtual-link mapping 
between node i and node j.  
•  ∈ 0, 1: 1 if path p survives disaster y. 
• Y= {y | y = <Ey, >}: Set of disasters where Ey is the set of 
links that are part of Disaster y and  is the probability that 
disaster y causes a failure. 
Variables: 
• 
 ∈ 0, 1: 1 if a controller is deployed and active on node 
f. 
•  ∈ 0, 1: 1 if there is a virtual link between controllers s 
and t. 
• !
 ∈ 0, 1: 1 if switch i is assigned to controller f.  
• " ∈ 0, 1: 1 if virtual link between controller i and 
controller j carries flow for (s,t) ∈ ($, $).  
• &
 ∈ 0, 1: 1 if nodes i, f, s, and t are controllers. 
• '  ∈ 0, 1: 1 if path p is used for the virtual link between 
controller s and controller t. 
• (  ∈ 0, 1: 1 if path p is used for the virtual link between 
controller s and switch t. 
• )
 ∈ 0, 1: 1 if virtual link 
  survives disaster y. 
• )
  ∈ 0, 1: is 1 if virtual link between controller i and 
controller f carries flow for (s,t) ∈ ($, $) after disaster y 
 
The objective function below minimizes the risk of 
communication channel disruption in the control plane: 
 Minimize (Min-Risk Optimization) 
  
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ('

∈*∈* ·  + (
 · )	
∈∈  where 	
  is the probability of occurrence of a disaster. 
The resource minimization (Min-Resource) objective 
function of the disaster-unaware scheme for comparison 
purposes is as follows: 
 Minimize (Min-Resource Optimization) 
 
∑ ∑ ∑ ('

∈*∈* + (
 ) · 12345ℎ_&8_	∈  
where the resource usage is calculated as the total number of 
links used for the virtual link mappings between controller-to-
controller and controller-to-switch communication.  
 Reachability Constraint: 
∑ 
 · 
 ≥ 
∈:   ∀< ∈ =                 (1) 
It ensures that at least k controllers are active within the 
reachability island of any switch node (in our case k=2). 
Binarization of 
 Variable: 

 ≤ ∑ !
∈*                                      ∀8 ∈ $       (2a) 

 ≥ ∑ !
∈*  / @                             ∀8 ∈ $       (2b) 
where M is a very large number. All controllers which have an 
assigned switch should be up and running.  
Controller-Capacity Constraint:  
∑ !
∈* +  1 ≤             ∀8 ∈ $               (3) 
Total number of switches assigned to a controller should not 
exceed a maximum number to avoid overloading the 
controllers. We assume that each switch which has a controller 
on it is automatically assigned to that controller. 
Switch-Assignment Constraint:  
!
  ≥  
     ∀<, 8 ∈ =  Aℎ23 < = 8         (4a) 
∑ !
∈: = 1 − 
             ∀8 ∈ =          (4b) 
Every switch is assigned to exactly one controller within 
latency limits. If there is a controller located at a switch 
location, that switch is assigned to it, along with the other 
switches that are assigned to that controller.  
Latency Constraint:  
!
   ≤   
          ∀< ∈ =, ∀8 ∈ $              (5) 
A switch only can be assigned to a controller that is located 
within latency limits. If a controller is not within the 
reachability distance of a switch, it automatically sets !
  to 0. 
Switch to Controller Assignment Check: 
!
   ≤  ¬ ⋀  
  ∀< ∈ =, ∀8 ∈ $             (6)    
A switch can only be assigned to a node which has a controller 
on it. 
Setting Virtual Links Between Controller Nodes: 
&
 =    
⋀⋀⋀          ∀8, <, F, 5 ∈ $        (7a)      "
  ≤ &
               ∀8 ∈ $   ∀< ∈ $  ∀(F, 5) ∈ ($, $)  (7b) 
These constraints ensure that the virtual links are only selected 
between controller nodes. Note that, Eqns. (6) and (7a) can be 
linearized, but such linearization is not reported due to space 
limit. 
Flow-Conservation Constraint: 
∑ "
 
∈: − ∑ "
 
∈: G≥ 2 ,   < = F ≤ 2,   < = 5= 0,        &A I   ∀<, F, 5 ∈ $       (8) 
These constraints ensure that there will be at least two disjoint 
paths between every controller pair to be resilient against a 
single point of failure (node/link). These are the paths of the 
virtual control-plane topology. 
Virtual Links Determination Constraint: 

   ≤  ∑ ∑ "
  ∈*∈*        ∀8, < ∈ $           (9a) 

   ≥  ∑ ∑ "
  ∈*∈*  /@      ∀8, < ∈ $         (9b) 
 Based on the flows enforced in Eqn. (8), this constraint 
ensures that the virtual links are set between controllers. 
 
Controller- to-Controller and Controller-to-Switch Virtual 
Link Mapping to Physical Topology 
∑ '
∈JK =  
     ∀<, 8 ∈ $          (10a) 
∑ (
∈JK =  !
      ∀<, 8 ∈ $          (10a) 
This constraint ensures that one physical path should be 
assigned for each virtual link between any pair of controllers. 
Constraint to Determine if Virtual Links are Affected by a 
Disaster: ∑ '
∈JK ·  =  )
          ∀L ∈ M       ∀<, 8 ∈ $      (11a) )
  ≤  )
        ∀<, 8, F, 5 ∈ $ ∀L ∈ M           (11b) 
If the physical path '
  over which the virtual link i-f is 
mapped survives from the disaster, this means virtual links 
survive too. This constraint determines the controller-to-
controller virtual links survive a disaster. Binarization of )
  
variable is also performed. 
Survivability Constraint: 
∑ )
 
∈: − ∑ )
 
∈: = G
+1 ,   < = F −1,   < = 50,        &A I   ∀<, F, 5 ∈ $  ∀L ∈ M  (19) 
After any disaster, this constraint ensures that at least one path 
(composed of virtual links) survives between any controller 
pair. It is similar to the flow-conservation constraint, but it 
ensures post-disaster, and not the normal, operation. 
ILP is for static problems, and do not scale for large 
problem instances. By developing heuristic methods, this 
problem can be adaptable to a dynamic scenario where we can 
redesign and remap the control network (possibly by 
restricting the amount of allowable changes in the logical 
topology) when network state changes (e.g., when intelligence 
agencies predict an attack, risky regions in the network also 
change).  
V. ILLUSTRATIVE NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
We study a 14-node NSF physical network (Fig. 3) with 32 
Gbps link capacity. As the disaster scenario, we consider a 
large-scale EMP attack, which affects four nodes and seven 
links. We chose a drastic example to show that, even when 
large portion of the network goes down, our scheme can still 
make the remaining network functional by preserving 
connectivity for the control communication channels. There 
are six nodes attached to datacenters, namely nodes 1, 3, 5, 8, 
10, and 13, which are possible controller locations. For the 
latency constraint, each switch is allowed to connect only to 
controllers located within a 3-hop distance. If a switch has a 
controller on it, it will be assigned to that controller. We 
compare our disaster-aware control-plane design with a 
traditional (disaster-unaware) scheme which designs the 
control plane and its communication with the switches based 
on resource consumption minimization while providing 
protection against single-link failures.  
 
Fig. 3. NSFNet topology with a potential EMP attack. 
Different colors show EMP fields with different strengths. 
 
In the proposed scheme, risk is minimized using the 
objective function (Min-Risk) in Section IV. In Fig. 4, we 
compare these two schemes in terms of number of disruptions 
experienced in the control plane after a disaster. Figure 4 
shows i) the number of virtual links between switches and 
controllers that fail due to physical network equipment failure, 
and ii) the number of failed nodes where a controller is located 
for an increasing number of controllers deployed. We see that, 
as long as there are datacenters available outside of the 
disaster zone that meet latency requirements of the network, 
controllers are placed at these locations; but, in the disaster-
unaware scheme, controllers are placed in datacenters located 
at high-risk nodes. 
In Fig. 5, resource consumptions of the two schemes are 
compared in terms of total number of links that are used for 
control communication. Our evaluations show that our 
approach (Min-Risk) yields a significant decrease in the 
number of disconnected switches with an increase in the 
capacity required. The increase in capacity requirement is 
correlated with the predicted disaster scale. Protecting the 
network from an EMP attack can be costly due to its 
extremely large scale, and even in this dramatic scenario, our 
design requires 25% more resources compared to disaster-
unaware design (Min-Resource) when three controllers 
deployed (see Fig. 5), to save as much as 50% of the switches 
getting disconnected from the control plane.  
Fig. 4. Comparison of disaster-aware (Min-Risk) and disaster-
 unaware (Min-Resource) schemes in terms of disruptions on 
the control plane caused by an EMP attack.  
 
In this setting, three controllers were enough for disaster-
aware design (Min-Risk) to provide the lowest risk possible. 
When we force the design to have more controllers, some 
nodes in risky zones are also used as controllers, and this 
increases disruptions. For the disaster-unaware scheme (Min-
Resource), although more controllers do not necessarily mean 
better survivability, still we observe a sudden decrease in 
disruptions when we increase the number of controllers. The 
connections to and from the nodes that are failed during the 
disasters are not counted as disrupted. 
 
Fig. 5. Comparison of resource consumption of control plane 
and switch-to-controller communication channels. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have shown that the current disaster-
unaware distributed control-plane architectures are not 
sufficient to provide resilience in the event of disasters due to 
disconnections in the control network. We presented a 
disaster-aware, efficient and distributed SDN control plane 
that jointly minimizes the control-plane disconnections due to 
disasters and resource consumption for the control-plane 
network. Our solution determines the number of controllers, 
and their placement along with control-plane topology and its 
mapping to the physical network. Our initial evaluation results 
are promising, and we plan to develop a practical heuristic that 
solves the problem within strict time constraints since solving 
this problem is NP-hard. Also, the adaptability to changing 
network conditions due to disasters needs investigation. 
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